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ABSTRACT 
This study reviews the impact the divestiture of AT&T had on the South Dakota telecommunications 
market, and explains the technological changes that have occurred and how these changes have been translated 
into lower costs. The South Dakota telecommunications market is examined under the scenarios: 1) fully 
regulated; 2) partial regulation; and 3) unregulated market. ARIMA procedures are used to forecast changes in 
revenues under the two different regulatory schemes. The degree of constestability of the South Dakota 
Telecommunications market is investigated to determine if competitions is suitable for the unregulated scenario. 
The study argues that the market is competitive. 
DIVESTITURE, BY-PASS, ENTRY, CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION: 

CONFLICTING FORCES IN THE DEREGULATION OF THE 

SOUTH DAKOTA TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 

INTRODUCTION 
During the 1980s, three basic events occurred that shaped the business environment of the 
telecommunication industry in the United States and South Dakota in particular. First, the divestiture of AT&T 
of its operating companies in 1984; second, the growth of technology; and third, the host of new entrants 
providing long distance services. These lower priced, nonregulated wresellerw companies proliferated when the 
high-volume users were encouraged by the Wby_passw alternative to avoid the regulated access fees of the 
..• ___--- _ . ., __---_..__~~...<~.v_"._ .. "~ - -~----==-_____ 
Regional Operating Bell Companies (ROBC's). 
--------­
In South Dakota, the ROBC was Northwest Bell (NWB), later 
to be merged into U.S. West. 
The managerial issue faced by the South Dakota Public Utility Commission (pUC) was how to 
determine prices for NWB services. The alternatives were that the PUC retain price management or let the 
market determine prices. NWB had been a regulated natural monopoly and the provider of last resort for 
universal or in home service. Universal service rates had been cross-subsidized substantially. Long distance 
rates had been held artificially high and had become a convenient means for regulators to subsidize local 
telephone service (Crandall, 1988). Paradoxically, continued regulation would weaken NWB, eventually leading 
to higher charges for universal service to maintain reasonable rates of return. A worse-case possibility was that 
NWB would end up like the railroads in South Dakota (also a provider of last resort) with a monopoly over 
low-margin, non-profitable business and little of the high-margin, profitable business. 
REGULATED MARKET ENVIRONMENT 
Historically, rate-of-return regulation of the telephone industry had been justified on the basis that it 
was a natural monopoly, where the natural monopolist was the sole provider and seller of a good or service
, 
because technology made single firm production cheaper than any other alternative. The natural monopolist 
differed from the~monopo~that the technology was freely available to all potential competitors. ~AVI. fvt>1 ~ ./If-1(1vP.. at .J'Uu~ J.u..- ~~~'f 1 
The rapid rate of deregulation that- occurred in the late 1970s and £980s in the airlines, trucking, 
banking, and railroads industries was not as pervasive in the telephone industry, particularly for intrastate long 
4 
distance services. AT&T had been broken up as a result of the 1982 antitrust settlement, divesting itself of the 
RBOC's as specified in the Modified Final Iudgment in 1984. (Crandall, 1988) 
(i)Competitive entry by new firms occurred slowly at first but then accelerated largely because of two 
~---
factors. First, the access fees for toll services of the regulated RBOC's were held at presett1ement rates, while 
non-regulated "resellers" were guaranteed access fees set near the incremental cost of connecting the calls at
-
each end. These regulated presettlement rates for toll and private line services led to a continuous drain of high 
volume customers and revenues away from the regulated RBOC's as the "by-pass" option prompted customers 
to seek lower priced alternatives for intrastate toll services. (Iackson and Rohlfs, 1985; USTA, 1984; Yankee, 
1985) Second, the continued advance in electronic technology led long-distance switching equipment to fall 
precipitously in price, which in tum led to substantially lower first-cost entry barriers for new s.ompetitors 
and/or resellers. (Framm,1981) 
Cross-Subsidization 
Regulated overpricing ofjong-distance toll services prior to the 1984 AT&T Settlement allowed federal 
regulators to cross-subsidize local telephone service. After the divestiture, the practice of regulated overpricing 
- ''''"''' .... 
was passed to state regulators as an easy method to continue the cross-subsidization of local universal service. 
(FCC, 1985) The "by-pass" alternative developed slowly at first, and the ROBC's and state regulators were not 
forced to seek more efficient pricing systems, choosing instead to perpetuate the protective environment of the 
natural monopolist. Eventually, the e~g competitive environment fo~ RBOC's to seek market!ricing 
as an alternative to regulatory pricing because of shrinking revenues from loss of market shares to the by-pass 
. 
alternative. Concern about system efficiency by state regulators faded as the revenues of RBOC's (the provider 
of last resort of universal service) were being transferred to the "resellers" who had no such obligation. 
(Crandall: 1988) 
Pressure~r regulatory cross-subsidies will not likely subside. In fact, in light the price distortions and 
related costs, the political justifications for continued regulation in the telecommunications industry continue to 
be, first, the concern about the "monopoly bottleneck" of the local exchange by the ROBC's and, second, the 
related concern of protecting local universal service.(Derthick and Quirk, 1985; Kahn and Shew, 1981) 
I 
------------
, 
S , V'J 
This second concern is beyond the scope of this paper, except to hypothesize ~ cross-subsidiution rP~ 
probably serves to deter faster development of alternatives such as cellular or other like systems, thus ~
---..------~--~,---....\ 
maintaining the continued. dependence by some on existing local universal services. This exaggerated concern 
may not be alleviated until everyone is carrying a telephone in his or her pocket. 
In South Dakota, NWB lobbied hard for the passage of Senate Bill 42 (SB42) in the 1988 South Dakota 
Legislature. SB42 would allow the PUC to deregulate selected telecommunication services depending on the 
degree of competition among providers of that service. S~ provided for three categories of co~on: (I) 
noncompetitive, (2) emerging competitive, and (3) competitive category. 
---------------_._---_.._---------- -----------------' 
The PUC was directed by SB42 to hold public hearings and investigations to find which service or 
group of services fit into each category. The PUC was granted authority to make the final decision. The PUC's 
first and foremost interest was consumer protection. The economic health of NWB was secondary. although the 
two were not mutually exclusive. 
Tentatively, SB42 included in the noncompetitive category such multiproduct services as local exchange 
or Universal Service (access and transmission of two-way voice), emergency se~ces. coin telephone. and other
------._­
----- ---------~-~~----.------
essential services. These would continue ~be rate-of·return price regulated by the PUC. 
'--------_.­
The emerging competitive category was defined by SB42 as service for which at least 20 percent of the 
............- ---..11.0 

company's NWB customers in South Dakota had alternatives available for that service. Tentatively. the 
legislature included intra·LATA message toll service (MTS or long distance), intra-LATA wide area telephone 
service (WATS), and new products and services not functionally required to provide local exchange service. 
The co~tive environment of intra-LATA long distance (MTS and WATS) was the critical service 
- ~---------------<--..-,.......-.----.-..-----~--~-.-.- <'-- .---.- "'""'-•• -~-------
that concerned both the PUC and NWB. The PUC would have price oversight over emerging competitive 
""'"'-------.<--~-.-- '--'",,"-_ ~."__,__~-t ---------- • 
services, ~d not retain rate of return price regulation. Price oversight meant that NWB could lower 
-----~-~-, ..,,-----"-­
tariffs on MTS and WATS but could not raise tariffs without approval of the PUC. The cost associated with 
these services would be eliminated from the rate of return base. Some members of the PUC objected to putting 
MTS and W ATS in this category, arguing MTS and W ATS should be noncompetitive services and remain 
regulated. 
6 
The fu!!y competitive category of SB42 in~!~m.se..rI.'!~[<?~_whlch I!~Jeast.~~~~t oft:be ..~usto.mers 
of NWB had alternative services available. Tentatively, this included optional services such as custom calling 
and touch tone, CentronlCentrex, billing and collection services, cellular radio service, premise cable/inside 
o 
wire and private line/special access. TheliE.....services could be priced competiti,:~)~~ but could ':!e~lassified if 
they no lon~r met the criteria of the category . 
. ---.,.. 
~ 
Within 90 days of the effective date of the legislation, the PUC was to determine if the services were 
properly classified. The PUC was to determine: I) the number and size of alternative providers, 2) market 
share, 3) impact on universal service, and 4) the ability of the market to hold prices close to cost. A fifth 
standard, which was basically undefined, included the ability of alternative producers to provide the functionaJly 
--------------_W_"_h< 
equivalent service at competitive rates, terms, and conditions of service. 
---~ -:::----=---­..-:=~~.----.-
South Dakota. a Two-Tiered Market 
The South Dakota telecommunications market prior to 1980, for all practical purposes, was a 
completely regulated market. AT&T provided interstate MTS and W ATS service to South Dakota. In 1980 the 
FCC allowed interstate resale through WATS lines. By May 1982, the South Dakota PUC extended this to 
intrastate service. In 1983 interstate resellers began to provide W ATS long-distance service. In 1984 with the 
Modified Final Judgment the RBOC's filed interstate access tariffs with the FCC. NWB then filed intrastate 
access tariffs with the PUC in May 1986. (Vondras, 1987) 
Pri~ to SM2 and 88 mandated by the ':1:!C, NWB's long distance rates av~~ rna..!:" per minute • 
.~.--"-~-~"'-.. - .- ,~.-~ -­
As of 1983, the PUC permitted reselling of NWB services. Resellers, not regulated, set their rates 
competitively. Their intrastate long distance rate averaged 16 cents per minute. This nine cent differential 
allowed NWB's competitors to capture a significant share of the long-distance W ATS market, particularly the 
high volume business users. The results were a two-tiered market, one tier that was regulated (NWB), the 
second tier a non-regulated competitive market. 
Access fees set by regulation at 6.4 cents per minute for connection and termination provided tb,e 
.... .._-;;, -.......... . ...... 

resellers with a comfortable price-cost cushion of slightly more than nine cents per minute. By 1988, 19 
~ 
resellers had entered the field as direct competitors to NWB's long-distance services. Twenty-two firms or 
- - ----
- -
7 
government aeencies had constructed their own switchine and transmission facilities to handle their 
communication needs. These facilities had the capability of makine these firms and aeencies potential 
competitors. Al...9toup.!!tese new competitors represented only_2~_oI_~'s accounts, they had provided 35% 
~--~----------~---..---.-..~---' - '!""•.• '~- ,"") -----:::.:..":..-:-..:---.~--
of NWB's revenues. (Vondras, 1987) 
------' 
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES 
Technological evolution in electronic hardware, installation and maintenance bas substantially reduced 
costs of by-pass and switchine equipment. Technoloey bas also resulted in cheaper, more reliable equipment, 
with ,reater performance features and better overall quality and durability. A rule of thumb in the electronics 
industry is that technoloJY results in a 20% per year decline in costs. (Jackson and Rohlfs, 1985) Since this 
evolution bas persisted for more than 30 years, there was reason to believe the trend would continue. 
Three technologies involved in buildine an alternative by-pass system include transmission, 
muitiplexm,/concentration, and agregation. Transmission is the basic buildine block of the telecommunication 
industry, the means of carryine a sipal from one location to another. Multiplexine and concentration allow 
many sipals to be combined and carried over a sinele transmission link. AeJreeation technologies allow a 
number of small users who mieht be located in the same general area (industrial complex, office complex, 
mall, etc.) to cluster together for a transmission to either an inter- or intra-state carrier and avoid the10cal
--------------',.' '--'---­
operating company (NWB in this case). All of these technologies were available on the market. 
r------,.-------..... 
Transmission 
Transmission comes in two basic forms; radiated electromagnetic wave systems (microwave, satellite, 
mobile radio) and guided wave systems (fiber optics, paired wire, and coaxial cable), Both systems have 
advantages and disadvantages. First capital costs are greater for fiber or wire, but maintenance costs are lower. 
Fiber is more cost effective for sbort-distance and bigh capacity links. Micro wave is low cost but requires 
frequency, line of sight, and license clearance. Both systems had declined dramatically in cost and were 
available from several vendo1'8. For exarople, in 1988 the initial capital costs, $225 per voice, of a micro wave 
were one balf of the price it was in 1984 for the same link. Projected costs by 1994 are $75. Fiber systems 
have declined dramatically, as wen, but costs of installation and righ~f-way have not. Consequently, costs 
8 
wiU probably stabilize for fiber systems. (Adamson et al. 1988) 
Multiplexinll 
Multiplexing allows numerous calls to be combined and transported over a single communication link. 
allowing efficient use of high capacity transmission systems. particularly large users during peak period traffic. 
Large volume customers. using multiplexers with or without their own transmission networks can by-pass NWB 
and go directly to intrastate rescUers or interstate carriers. A fully installed mUltiple access exchange with 
advanced features and computers could be purehased in 1988 for $400 per voice channel. A medium sized unit 
capable of 2000 calls simultaneously can be installed for $800.000 (Adamson, 1988) 
Using the advertized rate schedule of one intrastate rescUer of 17.76 cents and 14.21 cents for day and 
night calls, and NWB access charge of 6.4 cents for coun.ection and termination, the rescUers aross operating 
margins could be U cents and 8 cents respectively. Disregarding incidental costs of billing, accountina. 
advertising. and utilities. the payback time would be determined by dividing first capital costs by the aross 
operating margin revenues per minute. The system would take just 30 days if operated at 10% capacity to 
recover first capital costs (less than 3 days at 100% capacity). 
Initial capital-costs for a potential rescller in this industry would be very low indeed. Salvage value upon exit 
would parallel the decline in new equipment costs, plus minimal wear and tear. 
Aggreption 
Aggregation technology allows the direct coUection of long distance traffic from a cluster of locations 
to by-pass local exchange access and transportation facilities. Aggregation is particularly attractive to individual 
businesses which are not large enough to justify owning their own multiplexer system. Grouping together, they 
can realize the economic advantages of a multiplexer and perhaps of a partial or complete transmission system. 
MARKET CONFIGURATIONS 
Conventional wisdom at the PUC was that NWB was tbe dominant firm and it bad to be rate-of-retum 
- =:::. 
price regula~ to protect the MDSUJDe[ and emerama firms providiu& altemativ~~tive services from 
---"..-..'-----------,~~'--...--"-"--"­
Full price regulation would require artificial entry barriers to be created by the regulatory board in 
9 
order to make NWB the sole provider of services. Since the FCC bad already allowed. interstate resale of 
WATS in 1980 and the PUC bad sanctioned intrastate WATS in 1982, it was clear that NWB had significant 
intraLA T A competition by 1983, if not earlier. To all but the most stubborn regulator the theoretical benefits of 
a return to full price regulation was far outweighed by the costs. Those costs included. the bureaucratic 
difficulties of artificially determining the price and output levels to insure average cost pricing and a normal rate 
of return. Compounding the pricing problem were the myriad of prices to be charged. for multiple services; 
proper rate of return that would provide incentive for capital base expansion and new technologies; and, not the 
least, the cost of denying competitive entry in a dynamic, complex, and highly technical multiproduct industry. 
All of these costs would eventually have to be born by the consumer in the form of higher rates. 
Partial market regulation of the dominant firm's services bad led. to the two-tier pricing structure. The 
~--. ~- --~--~-'-.-------- ---~- ~-. -.-~- ...--.-~-.-.--.'"...~.--~-
majority of the PUC liked. this market configuration and resisted. classifying NWB's long distance and WATS 
services into the emerging competitive category. Basically the PUC_seemed to fear that NW!tw()!Jld do!"i~ 
the competitive fringe, even if the competitive fringe accounted. for more than 20 percent of the market share. 
The critical issue facing the PUC was to maintain the financial and economic health of NWB. the supplier of 
last resort of a cross-subsidized service, in a market drawing a host of new entrants. 
The concern of regulators was whether the unmanaged. market would be conducive to competitive 
behavior. Incentives to enter or exit the market were the key issues. Firms enter a market when they can earn 
economic (excessive) profits and leave a market when they incur economic losses. The potential entry of 
competitors and the exit of weaker competitors determine the degree of market contestability. Matets with a 
high degree of contestability typically demonstrate competitive behavior (normal profits). Markets with a low 
degree of contestability are unable to keep prices near production costs and allow persistent economic profits. 
To comprehend the dynamics of market contestability and apply it to the South Dakota telecommunications 
industry, we need to investigate the evolution of the theoretical implications of contestable markets. 
Evolution of Economic Thou.t 
Pure competition and pure monopoly are static polar models which although extremely useful, do not 
approximate the real world. The pure competitive model demonstrates productive and allocative efficiency 
---- l 
~ ~~ 
. '\ \ "­r"" \ ! ',t..~b
., " \, J,!.,~ ; ~'\-- ~''''''' " 10 
~ (hfr 0/ 
norms, while the ~~ly model demonstrates market power and the resulting loss of efficiency. Neither 
model contains elements of rivalous behavior. The popular notion is that the fewer the number of firms, the 
greater the tendency towards monopolistic behavior, which in tum means higher prices to consumers, economic 
profits to producers, and static efficiency losses to society. This was the mind set of the PUC in 1988. 
In the 50s, 60s, and 70s, Joseph Bain and others tried various approaches to describe imperfect market 
behavior. Bam concentrated on the three elements of the market: structure, conduct, and perfol1DlUlCe. He 
saw a causal relationship between the three elements. If the structure was good (e.g., many firms) ODe should 
expect good market conduct to follow (pricing, output, and product innovation) and, in the end, good 
performance (efficient use of resources). Early market structuralists studied industry concentration ratios to 
predict conduct and perfOI1DlUlCe. Disappointed. with concentration ratios to explain behavior, Bam turned. to 
entry barriers as the most important variable of market structure. Bam found that low entry baniers resulted. in 
the established firms setting prices only slightly above the so-called competitive level to avoid attracting new 
entrants. If entry baniers were high, established firms could persistently raise prices without attracting new 
competition. 
In 1982, William Baumol, John Panzar, and Robert Willig published their theory of contestable 
markets. The theory focused on understanding the mUlti-product industry cost structure and the implications for 
competition and market perfol1DlUlCe. They drew heavily upon previous economic thought, particularly the 
welfare and efficiency criteria of the classic purely competitive model and Bain's notion of entry baniers and 
market structure. Unlike the theory of pure competition, Baumol's hypothesis did not rely upon the 
assumption of atomistic structure (large numbers of firms selling a homogeneous product, with all firms being 
..".. 
price takers). Instead, a contestable market was simply one in which there was considerable freedom of entry 
or exit. This did not mean that entry was costless or easy, but merely that the potential entrant suffers no 
disadvantages in terms of production technique or perceived product quality when compared. to those already in 
the market. The potential entrant evaluates whether to enter the market on the basis of prices being charged by 
those already in the market. If the potential entrant sees an existing economic profit the firm enters the market. 
Freedom of exit must also be possible in a contestable market. The firm must be able to leave the market by 
11 
recouping its costs. This means that the capital investments the entrant brought into the market can be resold 
and reused without loss, except for normal wear and tear and depreciation. Freedom of exit and recoup costs is, 
in reality, a factor in the decision to enter a market. 
The critical feature of a contestable market is that it is vulnerable to potential entry by competitors. 
~~-..:..;-..;;.."--~ 
The competitor can enter the market, collect a profit and exit the market when prices change without capital 
loss. Hence, a contestable market is a competitive market. Thus, even if the market were dominated by a 
natural monopolist, it could,still be a competitive market as long as the conditions of contestabilit}' exi~, 
____....,..___.,=__ ......----..,1 
namely~try. The allocative efficiency norms (welfare characteristics) of a contestable market 
are the same as that of a purely competitive market without the unrealistic assumptions. 
The tirst efficiency_norm is that prices charged for the goods and services must be equal to economic 
cost. Any price greater than economic cost would result in excess profits, giving the potential entrant room to 
undercut the price of the incumbent producer and quickly make Urofit until the incumbent lowers its ,price. 
Consequently, zero economic profits would exist. This is a necessary condition to avoid potential hit-and-run 
entry by new entrants. This is also the reason why the mere opportunity for hit-and-run entry is sufficient to 
cause a natural monopolist to avoid excess profits. 
The second norm is that productive efficiency would also be maintained (production at the minimum 
-
cost). Just as profits would be an invitation to enter, so would any form of inefficient organization of 
l 
Production. Unnecessary costs would provide incentive for the potential entrant. t I l .,? ,--i~) 
. . ~~ 
The third welfare characteristic of a contestable market is that no product __ ~ +J-'~r 
than its marginal cost. A price at less than marginal cost of production would mean that a potential entrant 
~.
could enter the industry and produce a slightly smaller quantity and make a profit. This welfare characteristic is ) 
particularly important for the regulated market. It means that if cross-subsidy of some service is taking place 
(e.g., universal service subsidized by regulated toll service), allowing nonregulated firms to underprice regulated 
service would be tantamount to unfair competition. 
The interesting implication of the contestable market theory is that most or all of the welfare criteria 
contained in the purely competitive model (thought to be the ideal) can also be found in a multi-product, or 
------------------
12 
multi-service market vulnerable to hit-and-run entry. This holds true regardless of market structure in terms of 
number of firms aodJor homogeneity of its product(s). The only requirement for a self-correcting force is the 
-
presence of low-to-moderate barriers to entry. 
~--------------------------~ REGULATO:RY ENVIRONMENT 
To simplify the array of possibilities, three models of regulation were examined: Fully Regulated 
South Dakota Markets, Partial-Market Regulation, and Unrestrained Competition. 
Scenario One: Fully Regulated South Dakota Market 
NWB would be regulated as if it were a natural monopoly. All competitive activity would be naturally 
blocked and complete price regulation would be achieved. The monopolist and the consumer would be 
protected with a price that reflected fair rate of return. This model was considered to be too costly, ( 
- - 1 11 _~"\,\ J ~~J\" 1.11bureaucratically unyieldly, and unrealistic given previous court decisions. \ JV" vv.n 
..... (J.J1J\f J. \ 
Scenario Two: Partial Market Regulation '-> 
The PUC had permitted reselling of NWB capacity as early as 1983. While NWB's nominal revenues 
have been rising, real toll call revenues have declined under the partial market regulatory configuration (Figure 
I). 
NWB's long distance rates as mandated by the PUC average $.25 per minute, while the resellers setting 
prices competitively average $.16 per minute. The $.09 differential allowed NWB's competitors to capture a 
significant share of the long-distance market after partial regulatory policies were adopted. 
To demonstrate the effect of partial market regulation an ARlMA (autoregressive integrated moving 
average) model was fitted to NWB toll revenues to forecast monthly revenues through 1992 under two regulatory 
i' 
assumptions. The~ forecast assumes ~regulation ~ugh 1992 with no ~mpetition (Figure 2). The 
- v 
second forecast assumes partial market regulation and forecasts revenues from lanwu:y 1988 to 1992 (Figure 3). 
Comparing NWB's 1987 real revenues with that predicted by the ARIMA model under full regulation suggests 
that NWB experienced an 18 percent declipe in real toll revenues (approximately 18 million real dollars). 
The ARIMA forecast for both full and partial regulation was made through 1992. Under full regulation 
NWB toll call revenues were predicted at $4.2 million per month, while under partial regulation toll call 
--
13 
revenues in 1992 were forecast at $3.8 million per month. Partial market regulation could thus be translated 
into approximately a 20 percent decline in toll revenue for NWB by 1992 (Figure 4). The shaded areas 
represent lost revenues to NWB under the two-tiered market of partial regulation. 
The tendency to by-pass occurs in the profitable high vo)ume, hi~ revenue telecommunications 
.. 
submarket (i.e., business customers). As overall revenues decline with the increasins propensity to by-pass, the 
PUC will be forced to entertain subsequent rounds of rate management. Through the attempt to recover lost 
revenues and defend the required rate-of-retum through rate averaging, NWB and the PUC would become 
entangled in a vicious cycle of rate adjustments which will only induce more frequent competitor price response
-"'" ---------..--~---
If NWB's revenues continued to decline on intraLATA services, the PUC would be faced with two 
possible courses of action to defend the target rate of return. It could allow NWB to compete by reducing 
intraLATA prices or allow an increase in universal service rates to recoup at least part of the intraLA T A 
revenue loss. In the former case, a rate reduction which is allowed too late to allow recapture, may fail to 
increase NWB revenues in any event. This, in tum, would require price increases on NWB's universal services 
despite the belated attempt to recapture lost intraLA T A revenues. 
The increased use of by-pass by high-volume, price-sensitive users and increased price competition for 
commercial traffic will ultimately shUl..!!e h!!::!:' Dr,.,... fw: the regulated NWB intraLATA and ~versal 
service system to fewer and fewer !jSetS. Since the by-passers are the high-volume, price-sensitive commercial 
..... ----­
users, the group bearing the sreater share of the cost will be the low-volume, price-insensitive residential users, 
those least able to bear the increased costs. 
The partially regulated market presents yet another ominous characteristic. IfNWB loses enough 
market share and enough of its ability to compete, there will be less incentive to invest in new innovative 
------------------------------~ 
technologies: Users of the partially regula ted phone system could be saddled with increasingly obsolete and 
inefficient equipment. Meanwhile, the unregulated firms could Sain further competitive advantase by investing 
in state-of-the-art systems. 
The ARIMA projections were not meant to portend the demise of NWB, but merely to ~monstrate that 
14 
the market is and bas been con Ie. If SB42 were used to accommodate contestability. potential good results 
would prevail in a competitive market. 
The reclassification of long distance service in the emerging competitive or fully competitive category 
would effectively eliminate the two-tier pricing system. The emerging competitive criterion of SB42 required 
...... ... . 
"'~-" ............ 

the availability of alternative competitive service to at least 20 percent of the customers receiving NWB 
services. The fully competitive criterion requires SO percent availability of other suppliers of the service or that 
the services are sufficiently discretionary that regulation is unwarranted. fv'1 ~"'f..(.f-.. 
\........-_"J:).. ~ i 

In September 1988. there were 19 firms in SouJll Dakota providing MTS and W ATS long~stance 
-.",.. 2 
services to businesses and residences. Customers in all NWB exchanges bad access to long~stance services 
provided by competitive common carriers. Intra-LATA MTS and WATS more than meet the emerging 
competitive classification test of 20 percent availability, and, given the level of competition, the SO percent 
availability criterion of the fully competitive classification. The intent of SB42 was to allow a competitive 
market structure to develop. SB42 allowed unrestricted entry and exit by competing firms. while NWB was 
prohibited from abandonment. 
Scenario 3: Unrestrained competitive Scenario 
An unrestrained competitive scenario assumes NWB is unhindered in setting prices on emerging 
competitive services (namely MTS and W ATS). Under S042. the PUC bas the authority to investigate any 
NWB price change. which would have the pffe&t of inhibiting ~rtricinlJ by NWB. If NWB were allowed 
to price freely in reaction to its competitors. its long distance rates would decline to the competitive price levels 
of the competitors' long distance services. Under this scenario. the telecommunication market would become 
competitive as NWB and its competitors actively contest for market share via price competition. 
Due to the regulatory structure which allowed entry. long distance markets in South Dakota displayed 
competitive behavior even prior to SB42. Existing competition from 19 existing reseUers already provides a 
major source of competition. Transmission systems could be purchased in the Datioual market which was 
competitive in nature. The costs of micro-wave and fiber optic equipment was fairly low and falling, further 
reducing the risk of a sunk cost and increasing the potential entry and further increasing the conlestability of the 
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market. 
Resener entry ~~ga1 - only a switching device, building, and incidental installation and 
operating costs. Private line service required for linkage between NWB's local switched access and the 
resellers's switch can be provided by NWB or could be customer installed. 
The first capital costs for the ISWitclJ is relatively minor, $250-500 thousand. Resellers could recover 
r 
those capital costs in one month at cummt rates. Furthermore, the switches could be resold if the reseller exits 
the market. Consequently, rescners do not face significant sunk costs, and their business activity in the long 
e:::::::..::::::::.. .. ~-=. _~~~~:..~~~ 
distance market approximates costless entry and exit. Five existing inter-LATA common carriers (including 
AT&T, MCI, and US Sprint) already provide fierce competition to guarantee a sustainable long distance 
market. Competitive price behavior is essentially a foregone conclusion. Additional firms win enter as demand 
expands. 
A major concern of the PUC is the effect on competitive forces if existing rescUers left the market, and 
what would happen if the South Dakota market ::..,ere unable to sustain all five _common carriers and the ~et 
configuration drops to a small enough number of firms where pricing became noncompetitive. Due to lack of 
entry barriers, rescUers would re-enter the market to earn economic profits; firms with private tggpnission 
,. 
facilities would enter the market by selling their excess capacity; large capacity customers of the remaining 
common carriers would construct their own transmission facilities; and due to low sunk: cost, new common 
carriers would enter the market. Even if the sustainable market configuration became an oligopoly (or even a 
natural monopoly), the threat of "potential" entry win constrain market prices to competitive levels. 
Conversely, it is equally likely that sustainable market configuration would contain a number of efficient 
resellers as well as the existing transport firms. In either case it can be concluded that the post-deregulation 
long-distance market will be competitive . 
.. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Long-distance markets arc sufficiently contestable to maintain a competitive behavior. If NWB were 
fully deregulated in the MTS and WATS market, it would pose no threat to the competitive environment of the 
South Dakota telecommunications industry. Competitive behavior in South Dakota would mirror the market 
16 
structure in the interstate telecommunications industry. In the long-run, the only healthy financial alternative for 
NWB and consumers of universal service would be unrestrained competition. 
Epilogue 
In 1989, the PUC ruled that MTS and WATS would be placed in the emerging competitive category, 
thus subject to price oversight. US West immediately petitioned for rate reduction. Estimated savings to 
• - ""' 
consumers were put at $4.2 million per year. This was followed in 1990 by a second rate reduction of $1.7 
million more per year. Average rates have decreased by more than 20%, with contracted WATS rates to high 
F 
------------------------------­
volume users dropping by as much as 50%. The number of competitors have increased to more than 30 firms. 
~ c-
Rates for universal service have remained ~changed fo!~re than seyen-lears. Coilsumers and U.S. West 
have benefitted by deregulation. 
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